The Japanese banking industry, including the cooperative sector has been restructured following the crisis of the 1990s. Here we examine the relationship between size and scale economies of cooperative banks in Japan (namely Shinkin and credit cooperatives). We use the translog cost-function methodology and intermediation approach coupled with a large set of both cross-sectional and panel data over the period 2003 to 2006. We find significant diseconomies of scale for both the full sample and sub-samples of small and large cooperative banks. It is of interest to note that larger cooperative banks were at cost disadvantage as compared to small ones throughout most of the period. Thus, bigger is not always better. Shinkin and credit cooperative banks need to make further efforts to assess the business environment and strengthen profitability by, for example, expanding the range of financial services they offer in their regional areas and making further progress in risk management.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the global banking industry has been through a period of restructuring. The mergers and acquisitions boom in the sector has been based on the idea that "bigger is better". More recent history has shown that even the largest banks have been unable to keep afloat without government help as the credit crisis has deepened. This of course reflects the way banks have managed, or failed to manage risk, but it also calls into question the notion that large banks are more efficient than small ones because they can exploit economies of scale and thereby reduce their costs.
The Japanese banking sector experienced crisis in the 1990s and has emerged apparently better able to deal with major shocks. Japan has an enormous number of banks including a thriving cooperative banking sector which consists of relatively small banks (224 banks and 1493 cooperative type financial institutions that is, Shinkin, credit cooperatives, labour banks, agricultural and fisheries cooperatives,
Japanese Bankers Association as at 1 Apr 2008).
This is a good time to study the Japanese cooperative banking sector in order to learn from the experience of a country that has already been through a banking crisis and a sub-sector that has been relatively neglected in previous research. We study economies of scale using the translog model and find that there are significant diseconomies of scale in most size bands within the Japanese cooperative banking sector. This implies that bigger is not always better, at least in cost terms. While the wave of banking mergers in Japan cannot be explained as a means of exploiting economies of scale, perhaps it was instead a response to technological change.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on economies of scale in banking, highlighting the evidence on Japan. Section 3 gives an overview of the Japanese banking system. Section 4 discusses the methodology, data and definition of variables. Section 5 presents the empirical findings and section 6 concludes the paper.
SIZE & SCALE ECONOMIES: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is a broad literature and debate on the degree to which scale economies exist in banking, but most studies concentrate on the USA and Europe. Studies of US banking usually observe slightly increasing return to scale (i.e. economies of scale) among small banks and slightly decreasing returns (i.e. diseconomies of scale) at large banks. Despite divergences among researchers as to what comprise a bank's outputs and inputs, most studies have concluded that there are no important economies of scale in US banking (see Benston, Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (BBHH), 1982; Gilbert, 1984; Hunter and Timme, 1986; Hughes, and Mester, 1998) .
In contrast to the American literature, studies of European banking show robust evidence of scale economies (Hardwick, 1989/90; Altunbas and Molyneux, 1996; Richard Simper, 1999) .
The evidence for Japanese commercial banking suggests that size is relevant in that smaller banks are the ones that experience increasing returns in most time periods.
The period under consideration is observed to be a critical factor in determining the results. For example, increasing returns to scale for banks of all sizes, including the largest ones were observed for the period 1980-1 and early 1990s, but not in between. Fukuyama (1993) reports that approximately 81% of Japanese banks experienced increasing returns to scale during the 1980s. This result was most pronounced in the small and medium size categories with just one-third to a half of the largest banks experiencing increasing returns. Tadesse (2005) studies the cost structure of Japanese banks over the period 1974 to 1991 and observes slight diseconomies of scale for large banks and significant scale economies for small banks. Using a cross-section of banks in 1997, Drake and Hall (2003) find economies of scale were obtained only for smaller banks but not for the larger ones. Studies which account for risk (Altunbas et. al., 2000 and Hughes et. al., 2001) indicate that larger banks take on more risk and that explains the diseconomies they experience. McKillop et al (1996) get slightly different results, obtaining economies of scale for all banks at sample mean for all years except for the late 1980s and onwards where constant returns prevail for all model specifications tested. They observe that Japan's largest banks demonstrate significant scale economies and attribute it to wide crossshareholdings between banks and other financial firms in Japan, which in turn provide banks with lower monitoring costs for their lending portfolios on the back of their direct participation in the ownership of many Japanese commercial businesses.
In contrast to the studies mentioned so far that use the translog model, Batchelor et al (2000) using the Fourier flexible form and a more recent data set find that the average cost curve in Japanese banking is flat. This indicates that there are neither economies nor diseconomies of scale.
Given that cooperatives are small, we would expect studies of this sector to provide similar results to those already reported for small commercial banks. Fukuyama (1996) examines the nature and extent of both technical and scale efficiency in Japanese credit associations by employing a nonparametric frontier approach for the year 1992. Using input-based measures, he observes that the majority of credit associations (53.1%) were subject to decreasing returns to scale (DRS) while 43.9% of them operated with increasing return to scale (IRS). This result is confirmed in later work by Fukuyama, Guerra, and Weber (1999) who analyse the overall efficiency and productivity growth of credit cooperatives in Japan during 1992-1996.
They find that 73% of credit cooperatives were found to run in the range of DRS while 23% function in the reach of IRS, with the remaining 4% operating with constant returns to scale.
OVERVIEW OF THE JAPANESE BANKING SYSTEM
There are three types of financial institution in Japan: the Central Bank, private and public financial institutions. We are interested in a small subset of the private depository institutions namely cooperative banks.
It is important to recall that there has been lots of consolidation of the Japanese banking industry and the total number of Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives has fallen dramatically since 1980 as shown in table 1 below:- Table 2 . Thus, they play an important role in Japanese financial markets. In addition to that, they enjoy a strong network as they have the biggest branch network spread throughout Japan. They are supervised by the Shinkin Central Bank.
Like commercial banks, Shinkin banks are covered by deposit insurance and exposed to capital adequacy requirements and other banking regulations and supervision. They differ from commercial banks in that they make loans mainly to member SMEs who capitalize the Shinkin banks. Shinkin banks can accept deposits from anyone whereas credit cooperatives can accept deposits only from members.
Credit cooperatives are inspected by the prefectural governments while banks, credit associations, securities companies, and insurance companies are under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. Shinkin banks are usually smaller than city and regional banks but larger than credit cooperatives as reflected by their deposit base as shown in Table 2 below:- The Japanese banking sector went through a crisis in the late 1980 and 1990s. This followed the bursting of the asset price bubble affecting land and stock prices. During the bubble period, the banks had expanded lending and now found themselves holding bad debts. The Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives were not immune to this problem (see Table 3 ). The government responded to the crisis by recapitalising some banks, encouraging consolidation in the sector, and introducing a deposit insurance system. It also took over the supervision of the Shinkin banks which had formerly been monitored by local government. Sour ce: Hanazaki, M. , and A. Horiuchi, (2003) 4. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
Research Design Issues
In working out the cost function of multi-product firms such as banks, we are faced with the constraint of identifying the appropriate specification. Although there have been many studies on the subject, there is no generally accepted definition of the inputs and outputs of multi-product financial firms.
The two most popular approaches are the production and intermediation techniques.
The production approach describes banking activities as the production of services for depositors and borrowers. Deposits and loans are counted as output; capital and labour as input and interest paid on deposits is not included in bank total costs. The drawback of this approach is that it fails to pick up the economically more interesting role of a bank as a financial intermediary and exclude interest expense representing the largest share of total costs.
In that respect, this study in common with many others opts for the intermediation approach, originally devised by Sealey and Lindley (1977) , whereby deposits combined with labour and capital are assumed to be utilised as inputs to produce loans and other earning assets as outputs.
Most studies comparing the 'translog' and 'Fourier flexible' form find that the translog provides better prediction and is more stable, while the difference between the two forms in terms of results is negligible (Berger & Mester, 1997; Altunbas, 2001) .
Based on these, we plan to use the 'Translog' cost function.
One problem that arises with cost studies is the association of cost among time periods and output. In other words, this occurs when output produced in one period is recorded in another period. In that respect, in order to solve this issue, most cost studies are undertaken using annual data or cross-sectional data.
The Model
Applying the duality properties, 'translog' cost functions are obtained by a secondorder Taylor series expansion of the cost function of the form:-
Where OC : Operating Costs (including interest on deposit)
Qi : the ith output (total loans + other earning assets) ; i =1,2 and Pj : the three jth input prices for labour, capital and deposits; j=1,2,3
Following Kolari & Zardkoohi (1987) , the 'translog' cost function for the case of this research is a log-linear quadratic local approximation to the arbitrary multi-product cost function specified in equation (a) Most studies using a translog cost function have included cost share factor equations to minimise the problem of degrees of freedom and improve efficiency in the estimation of the model. Consequently, using Shephard's Lemma (Shephard, 1970; Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau, 1973) , the associated cost share equations S i (The derived demand for input Xi) are then calculated by partially differentiating equation
(1) with respect to the factor prices LnP i .
It is important to highlight that the parameters in the share equations are a subset of those in the translog cost function, and estimation of this system of equations results in more efficient estimates than if we were to estimate Equation (1) alone.
The Associated cost share equations are: It is important to note that a critical property of a valid cost function is that it is homogeneous of degree one in factor prices, i.e. the regression coefficients of the first order factor prices should sum to one. Since the duality theorem requires that the cost function must be linearly homogeneous in input prices, the following restrictions have to be imposed on the parameters of the cost-function equation so as to adhere to one of the mentioned properties of a valid cost function (1):- Since the cost shares sum to unity, one must be dropped to avoid a singular covariance matrix (Berndt et al., 1974 ). It does not matter which one is dropped but we choose to drop S K . The estimated cost functions above provide the basis for computing economies of scale.
Differentiating the translog cost-function Equation (1) with respect to outputs, gives the measure of economies of scale (SE) i.e. equation (5) 
Data
The data sources were individual Japanese Shinkin and credit cooperative banks' Given that a complete set of variables is expected for the analysis of the bank cost structure, many of the banks for which data was partially missing had to be dropped.
The sample is then broken down into small and large cooperative banks based on their asset size. Small cooperative banks are classified as those having an asset size of less than $2 bn and large cooperative banks with an asset size above $2bn. Given the selected intermediation approach, we use two categories of outputs and three types of input variables. All variables in this study are measured in US million dollars. The translog cost function, assuming the intermediation approach in bank production is being applied. Three econometric models are estimated: (1) SUR analysis for cross-section studies (2) OLS for panel data (3) Fixed effects panel model. Using the intermediation approach in modelling the bank output/cost function, the first output is total loans and the second output is other earning assets.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Scale Economies in Japanese Cooperative Banking
Results of the Estimation using the Full Sample: All Cooperative Banks
Cross-Section Analysis
The full sample representing balanced data has been reduced to 293 cooperative banks in each year so as to enable consistent cross-sectional comparison over the Specifically, the cost function in equation (1) and two of the associated three share equations (2) and (4) are estimated simultaneously using Zellner's Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique in which the estimates are asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood estimators (Kmenta and Gilbert (1968) ).
SUR Analysis Estimates
We now turn to the main focus of this study, namely 'To what extent are there economies of scale in Japanese cooperative banks?'. Table B1 of Appendix B shows the translog cost function estimates obtained from regressing the system of equations (1), (2) The system of equations (1), (2) & (4) was also estimated by a 'full information maximum likelihood' process, but as there was little difference in the parameter estimates and the economies of scale measures, the results are not reported. We also carried out the two-step test procedure (promoted by Harwick, 1989 Harwick, /1990 ) to examine whether there are any relationships between the residuals and the output variable in the translog cost function used in the analysis. Three regressions were estimated using the residuals from the translog and the two share equations on output over each year of the sample as shown in Table A4 of Appendix A. The coefficients were insignificantly different from zero for each regression. A final test for heteroscedasticity was also conducted and at 5% critical levels, the White (1980) The first technique used in panel data estimation is ordinary least squares (OLS).
Panel data techniques analyse missing components as either fixed or random effects. The intercept for each of the individuals is not fixed. Thus the fixed effect model corrects this problem by including variables that lead the intercept to change cross-sectionally but not over time. On the other hand, Greene (2003) calls the random effects model a regression with a random constant term. This is because one way to deal with the ignorance or error is to assume that the intercept is a random outcome variable. The random outcome is a function of a mean value plus a random error.
For the full sample, we have adopted the 'balanced panel' approach, whereby each bank is always represented in each time period. A challenge in modelling a panel with long-time dimension is that variables are likely to be non-stationary. However, our sample has only four years time dimension. We thus investigate the nature of stationarity of our data by conducting unit root tests (Appendix A, Table A2 ). The test statistics reject the null hypothesis that the variables are non-stationary. This may be due to the short time dimension of our panel data set. We also perform unit root tests on the residuals from the cost function (1) for the full sample and observe that the cost function is balanced. Maddala and Wu (1999) .
OLS/ Fixed Effect Estimates
The results in Table C1 of Appendix C correspond to a panel data set using a translog function of Japanese cooperative banks over the four-year period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Given the short time dimension of the data set, we do not add any time trend to capture any technological change over time.
Initially, we run the tests using ordinary least squares (OLS). It can be observed that most of the parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level for the full sample and overall our model fits the data well with an R 2 of 0.95 for the cost functions. A. White Test (1980) for heteroscedasticity (Appendix A: Table A5 .2) was also conducted and at 5% critical levels, it failed to reject the null of homoscedastic errors for all cooperative banks; both, small and large. To determine which model to use (Fixed/Random effects), we conducted the Hausman specification Test (Appendix A, Table A6 ) and observe that there is correlation between unobserved bank-specific random effects and the regressors in the full sample, thus supporting the choice of the fixed effects model. We will now consider possible explanations for the significant diseconomies of scale observed for Japanese Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks. Firstly, this may be due to the fact that both Shinkin & credit cooperatives engage primarily in small business lending, which entails significant monitoring costs, thus making it difficult to exploit scale economies. It may also be attributed to their weak risk management and low profitability level. 
The sluggish improvement in earnings of
Does Size Matter in Japanese Cooperative Banking?
Results of the Estimation using Subsamples by Asset Size: Small vs Large Cooperative Banks
Cross Section Analysis
To get a better insight into scale economies, our next step is to investigate whether size matters in Japanese cooperative banking. Table B2 and B3 of Appendix B show the translog cost function estimates obtained from regressing the system of equations (1), (2) & (4) using SUR for the crosssection sub-sample of small and large Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks in Japan. Most of the parameter estimates are significant at the 5% level.
SUR Analysis Estimates
From the sub-sample estimates in Table 6 We can see that scale diseconomies increase as cooperatives banks' size gets larger within each annual sample. In other words, the small banks in the sample enjoyed a cost advantage over the larger banks as reflected by the indicators of scale economies. Test was performed and it is in favour of fixed effects model. It can be observed that most of the parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level for the full sample for OLS regressions. In contrast, few parameters are significant when using fixed effects model. Overall our model fits the data well with an R 2 of 0.95 and 0.99 for the cost functions using both OLS and fixed effects model respectively. Table 7 below shows the estimates of economies of scale, measured in line with expression (5), for the full sample using both OLS and fixed effects. For the large banks, the OLS and fixed effects results are consistent, indicating diseconomies of scale to the value of 4.12 and 1.64 respectively. Diseconomies are also observed for small banks, but only in the OLS model. Fukuyama (1996) who obtained decreasing returns to scale for the majority of credit associations in 1992.
Panel Data Analysis
OLS/ Fixed Effect Estimates
CONCLUDING REMARKS & FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The comprehensive restructuring of the Japanese banking industry, including the cooperative sector, has motivated questions about its economic rationale. Our One limitation of this study is that it ignores risk factors in the cost model. This study could thus be extended by incorporating the risks associated with Japanese cooperative bank's operations on their costs. In other words, testing whether the estimates of scale economies are increased or decreased once risk is taken into
account.
An area of research also deserving additional attention is comparing the scale economies and size effects of Japanese Shinkin banks against commercial banks and credit cooperatives. It will also be of great relevance for research and policy purposes to see if the Japanese cooperative banks' results carry over into other nations with cooperative banking markets.
Appendix A Hausman Specification Test Note: *, **, ***, denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Table B1 : All Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks ( SUR Analysis)
Coefficient
Estimates from the Translog-cost function obtained from regressing the system of equations (1), (2) & (4) using SUR analysis for the full cross-section sample are reported using the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the results obtained for Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include the natural log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as total personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnP L), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets ratios (P K ), and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit (P DEP ). Note: *, **, ***, denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Appendix B -Continued
Coefficient Table B2 : Small Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks ( SUR Analysis)
Estimates from the Translog-cost function obtained from regressing the system of equations (1), (2) & (4) using SUR analysis for the small crosssection sample are reported using the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the results obtained for small Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks (asset size of less than $2 bn) over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include the natural log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as total personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnPL), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets ratios (PK), and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit (PDEP). Estimates from the Translog-cost function obtained from regressing the system of equations (1), (2) & (4) using SUR analysis for the large cross-section sample are reported using the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the results obtained for large Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks (asset size above $2 bn) over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include the natural log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as total personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnP L), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets ratios (P K ), and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit (P DEP ). Note: *, **, ***, denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Note: *, **, ***, denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Table C2 : Small Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks
Coefficient
Estimates from the Translog-cost equation (1) using OLS and fixed effects analysis for the small panel data sample are reported using the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the results obtained for small Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks (asset size of less than $2 bn) over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include the natural log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as total personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnP L), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets ratios (P K ), and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit (P DEP ). Note: *, **, ***, denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Table C3 : Large Japanese Shinkin & Credit Cooperative Banks
Appendix C -Continued
Coefficient
Estimates from the Translog-cost equation (1) using OLS and fixed effects analysis for the large panel data sample are reported using the natural log of operating costs (LnOC) as the dependent variable. The columns report the results obtained for large Shinkin and credit cooperatives banks (asset size above $2 bn) over the years 2003 to 2006. Independent variables for each bank include the natural log of : outputs given by total loans (LnLOA) and other earning assets (LnEAR), inputs given by employee costs calculated as total personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (LnP L), capital costs proxied by other operating expenses to fixed assets ratios (P K ), and interest paid on deposits calculated as interest expense on deposit divided by volume of deposit (P DEP ).
